Webb"Why Agent-Caused Actions are Not Lucky," American Philosophical Quarterly 47: pp. 43-56. Mele, Alfred (1992). Springs of Action. Oxford University Press. Mele, Alfred (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press. Markosian, Ned (2010). "Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems," Philosophical Studies 157, pp ... WebbOn the Phenomenology of Agency and Selfhood Paulo Jesus They typify two language games or grammars tending to incommensurability and corresponding to the dual naïf …
Jan Patočka and French Phenomenology Journal of French and ...
Webb1 jan. 2024 · 1. Introduction. It is often held, and for a variety of reasons, that Hume advances an account of human agency that is implausible. 1 However, I want to focus on a specific criticism that is recurrent in the literature. It is that Hume, given his theory of causation, is committed to an account of human action that, if not altogether ... Webb3 mars 2003 · The Author shall grant to the Publisher and its agents the nonexclusive perpetual right and license to publish, archive, and make accessible the Work in whole or in part in all forms of media now or hereafter known under a Creative Commons 4.0 License (Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works), or its equivalent, which, for the … lite and easy summer menu
The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency
WebbIt draws on the extensive cognitive science and some of the controversy that has developed around the concept of sense of agency. The chapter introduces some … WebbTo understand the phenomenology of agency, we need to understand the complexity involved in action and intention. Moreover, since an individual’s action, and the … WebbBeing intentional, free-agency phenomenology has satisfaction conditions: it imposes requirements on how things must be in the world—how things must be with respect to oneself—in order for one actually to be exercising free agency in the way one experiences oneself as so doing. imperial rulers of ancient rome